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22.1 Introduction
In rural communities of the Gambia, as in the case of most other arid and semiarid
countries in the world, cereal banking is a common practice to store food at harvest
for use during lean periods. It is a community-based strategy of making food
available throughout the year and managing seasonal food price dispersions by
maintaining physical food reserves (Beer 1990). It aims at managing price and
climate risks.
Rainfall variability and food price volatility are some of the most important
risk factors that affect lives and livelihoods of poor rural households in import-
dependent countries such as the Gambia (Vicarelli 2011, p. 2; Wright and Cafiero
2009). This is due in part to their primary sector-based economy (which is sensitive
to climate conditions), their reliance on food imports, and their low levels of human
development and food accounting for a major part of their income and expenditure
(Kalkuhl et al. 2013; Wheeler and von Braun 2013; FAO 2011). These factors
account for high human costs resulting from climate and market shocks (FAO 2011;
von Braun and Tadesse 2012; Ivanic and Martin 2008).
In this chapter, we assess how cereal banking can be used as a viable option in
rural communities to enhance food and livelihood security in the face of climate
and price risks. In spite of cereal banking’s popularity in most of the arid and
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semiarid rural communities (Basu and Wong 2012; Bhattamishra 2012), the practice
has received little empirical scientific research.
22.2 Context
Our study was conducted in 134 rural communities, in a total of 13 districts from
three of six rural regions in the Gambia. 78 % of the active population in the
Gambia is engaged in rain-fed subsistence farming as a source of income and
food. Households in rural areas are generally larger (>12 members) and poorer,
with 48 % of the households below the national poverty line of $1.08 a day (GoG
2010). The traditional land tenure system allows for small land holdings inequitably
distributed among men and women (von Braun et al. 1989; Carney 1992). In
addition to other socioeconomic factors—such as urbanization, population growth,
inadequate input supply and the use of crude technology—rainfall variability has
an important multiplier effect on the ability of households to feed themselves.
The Gambia’s climate is Sahelian semiarid. Its location has been described as a
hotspot for climate change and food insecurity (Ericksen et al. 2011). The climate
consists of two seasons: a 4-month rainy season (June–September) and an 8-month
dry season. Because the rainy season is short, only a single cropping season is
feasible for rain-fed agriculture1 (Ceesay 2004). Only about 50 % of the country’s
food needs is produced locally (WFP 2011). The Gambia is thus regarded as a
food-deficit, import-dependent country. Inter-annual variations in food production
generally follow rainfall trends and variability.
Figure 22.1 shows an almost perfect positive correlation between rainfall vari-
ability and cereal production variability. Variability in Fig. 22.1 is a measure of
dispersion of each annual rainfall or production figure from their mean between
1991 and 2012, normalized by their standard deviation.
Figure 22.2 shows the gap between domestic consumption and production.
Rainfall variability has the potential to reduce domestic production. When coupled
with a global food crisis and a price hike, it could cause food prices to rise
drastically, eroding purchasing powers and resulting in poverty and malnutrition
among many Gambians (Kalkuhl et al. 2013). Given the country’s dependence on
food imports2 (60 % estimated by Tadesse et al. 2013), any changes in global food
availability and food prices will definitely affect foreign exchange rates, causing
inflationary pressures on food and non-food imports.
Food production, affordability, and consumption in rural areas of the Gambia
follow the agricultural cycle (Barrett 1996), as in most developing countries. During
harvest season, food is in abundance, and most households become net suppliers
of food. In the Gambia, the harvest season spans from October to February. Food
supplies tend to move from rural to urban areas because of higher prices (a
1Irrigated area is less than 6 % of arable land.
2WFP (2011) estimates 81 % dependence on rice imports, the country’s staple food.
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Fig. 22.2 Consumption requirement vs. net cereal production 1991–2011. Source: World Food
Programme—WFP (2011). Note: consumption requirement in the Gambia in 1000 metric tons to
meet a cereal demand of 175 kg/cap/year
consequence of higher demand) in the urban areas (Barrett 1996). However, food
is usually in short supply when approaching the rainy season (FAO 2011). Rural
households and communities become net buyers and often have to rely on imported
food from the urban areas. The reversal of food flow begins driving upwards food
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prices in rural areas. Production constraints, exacerbated by the absence of large
storage schemes and credit constraints, tend to worsen the price changes and the
spatial and temporal food availability (Barrett 1996). The transition in terms of the
duration of the food gap is influenced by rainfall patterns, among other things.
In years with low rainfall, inter-seasonal food price dispersion can be as high
as up to 400 % (von Braun et al. 1999). This dynamic affects rural households
and communities more—eroding incomes and causing seasonal food and nutrition
insecurity (WFP 2011). As a result, the problem of food insecurity is more seasonal
than chronic in rural areas of the Gambia. Every year, poor households in the rural
areas face the “hungry season,” a period of 3–4 months between July and September,
when household food stocks are low or depleted (FAO 2011). The Comprehensive
Food security and Vulnerability Assessment Report (WFP 2011) observed that in
the months of August and September, about 80 % of the rural households reported
food-insecure conditions, while only 10 % reported being food insecure between
December and April. Similar studies on seasonal food security programs in East
Indonesia and Bangladesh (Basu and Wong 2012; Khandker 2009 respectively)
observed similar seasonal food insecurity dynamics.
22.3 Methodology
Our methodology is based on a large scale randomized control trial (RCT) imple-
mented in the Gambia called the Community Driven Development Project (CDDP).
The project, funded by the World Bank, was implemented in the Gambia from 2008
to 2011. Using a poverty index as a basis for stratification, 930 out of about 1800
villages were eligible, and of the 930 eligible villages, 495 were randomly chosen
for the CDDP intervention (Arcand et al. 2010). 35 of the 495 villages chose cereal
banking from a wide range of possible projects based on the needs and aspirations
of their communities.3
We note that while selection for CDDP intervention was randomized, the
choice of subprojects such as cereal banking was not. It was likely influenced
by endogenous village characteristics. Evaluating the impact of such subprojects
requires the use of quasi-experiments (Abebaw and Haile 2013).
Subsequently, we have to investigate the determinants making these villages
choose cereal banking for their subproject. These factors must be controlled to
minimize selection bias and fulfil the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA)
(Heckman et al. 1997; Angrist and Pischke 2008).
3Participatory project identification methods were used; villagers chose the subproject at village
meetings.
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22.3.1 Propensity-Score Matching
In propensity-score matching (PSM), researchers try to balance groups by matching
treatment and control units based on the characteristics that affected their probability
of receiving treatment—which, in this case, is cereal banking (Heckman et al. 1997;
Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). PSM ensures that at baseline and on average, groups
are identical in terms of observed characteristics (Heckman et al. 1997; Caliendo and
Kopeinig 2008). The method requires finding a control group which bears similar
characteristics as the treatment group in all respects; however, the control group does
not receive treatment. If a treated group and a potential control group have matching
propensity scores, then the difference between outcomes of the two groups is an
unbiased estimator of the treatment effect (Heckman et al. 1997; Ravallion 2007;
Abebaw and Haile 2013). However, this assumption becomes invalid if there are
important unobservable factors that affect treatment and outcomes (Caliendo and
Kopeinig 2008). The method can be improved by using fixed effects which captures
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneities (Olken 2012).
We estimate the propensity of a community participating in a cereal banking
scheme using a nonparametric logit model:
P .CB/ D ˇVc.i/ C ".i/; (22.1)
where P(CB) is the probability of participating in a cereal bank; ˇ represents
parameters that must be estimated; Vc(i) is a vector of a village’s preexposure
level of social, economic, livelihood, natural, and market characteristics; and " is
an error term. On the basis of the CDDP assignment, we conducted PSM using two
subsamples:
• Matching cereal banking villages with CDDP-funded villages that opted for
subprojects other than cereal banking (partial control group)
• Matching cereal banking villages with villages that neither benefitted from the
CDDP funding, nor had cereal banking schemes (pure control group)
22.3.2 The Propensity-Score Matching Results
Data for the PSM were obtained from the 2003 National Population Census data and
National Agricultural Sample Survey 2007. From a total of 827 villages in all the six
rural regions in the Gambia, 22 pretreatment village variables were generated for our
PSM. Relative to the sample size of the treatment group (35), the large sample size
of possible control villages (780) ensures that the pretreatment mean differences
between the treated and their matched counterfactuals converge to zero (Chabé-
Ferret 2010), thus reducing sample selection based on observables (Baker 2000;
Heckman et al. 1997). A one-to-one nearest-neighbor matching algorithm without
replacement was employed as it enhances efficiency and reduces biases (Caliendo
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and Kopeinig 2008, p. 9). It also matches each treatment village to a unique village
from the pure control and the partial control groups.
The results of our PSM indicate the variables that influenced the villages to
choose cereal banking. Overall, the R2 indicates that our PSM model [Eq. (22.1)] has
strong explanatory power for the probability of a village choosing cereal banking.
Out of the 22 variables, 13 were statistically significant at 10 % significance level,
while 9 were statistically significant at 5 % significance level. Our coefficients are
expressed in odd ratios and not in marginal effects, but the p values indicate the level
of significance for each of the variables (Table 22.1).
The PSM results provide the following insights:
• Coefficient of variation of the prices4 (Huchet-Bourdon 2011) of the main food
crops in a village market, or in the market closest to the village,5 indicates price
dispersion and price risk. Our results show that communities facing high price
risk tend more to choose cereal banking. This is in agreement with existing
studies (Bhattamishra 2012; Cortès and Carrasco 2012).
Table 22.1 Results of propensity-score matching
Partial control PSM Pure control PSM
Variable Coefficient P > jzj Coefficient P > jzj
Coefficient of variation (rainfall) 13.8706 0.286 16.076 0.246
Coefficient of variation (price) 660.3531 0.006** 681.091 0.018*
Poverty 7.2494 0.035* 2.695 0.408
Availability of fruit trees 0.0512 0.033* 0.043 0.102
Millet grown 0.00134 0.004** 0.001 0.009**
Proportion of crop farmers 46.2541 0.029* 32.713 0.053
Average HH size 0.7248 0.209 0.283 0.501
Prop of Hhs without daily market 0.1836 0.046* 0.152 0.058
Prop of Hhs without improved trans. 0.5373 0.009** 0.476 0.038*
Dominant ethnicity gr. 3 14.6823 0.003** 7.953 0.09**
Dominant ethnicity gr. 2 7.4451 0.004** 3.842 0.113
Connected and lowland villages 1.1066 0.109 1.618 0.039*
Distance to market 0.5274 0.038* 0.446 0.033*
Proximity of the LGA 33.20208 0.024* 33.592 0.02**
Proximity of the district 2.873271 0.021* 3.023 0.016*
Cov_Price2 1128.559 0.004** 1157.499 0.016**
No. of observations 451 422
R2 0.4549 0.3947
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01
4See Huchet-Bourdon (2011).
5The price data is collected from 28 markets in the Gambia on a monthly basis.
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• Access to market is measured by the distance from a village to the closest
weekly market. The availability of improved transport systems indicates if a
village is connected or remote. The more isolated a community is, the higher
the probability that it will choose cereal banking. This is similar to findings of
existing studies (Afrique Verte 2010; Bhattamishra 2012). A great distance to
markets may motivate communities to store food because households in these
villages may incur high transaction and transportation cost, Daviron and Douillet
2013).
• The probability of choosing cereal banking is significantly different between
communities with food surplus and those with food deficit (Bhattamishra 2012;
Cortès and Carrasco 2012). Lowland villages, which are in close proximity to the
River Gambia—a source of fresh water for irrigation—often have more favorable
environment for farming (Ceesay 2004; von Braun et al. 1989). In most cases,
they produce more food crops, especially rice, relative to the villages located in
the upland. A review of the choice of subprojects for the CDDP show that most of
the communities in the lowlands opted for production enhancement equipment,
access to fields, and gardening, rather than cereal banking (Arcand et al. 2010).
In general, the results of the PSM show that villages that are poor, remotely
located, and susceptible to rainfall and price volatility are more likely to choose and
maintain a cereal banking schemes (Cortès and Carrasco 2012; Bhattamishra 2012).
This highlights the importance of targeting the right villages when implementing a
program since not all communities equally need, or can sustain, a cereal banking
schemes.
The T-test (in Annex on Table 22.5 below) shows that before matching, some
significant differences between treated and non-treated villages were observed.
However, after matching, there are no significant differences between the two
groups. Unlike earlier researches that used PSM, our method gives superior results
because the PSM is built on both stratification and randomization (Arcand et al.
2010; Abebaw and Haile 2013). Using propensity-score nearest-neighbor matching,
we were able to generate a control group similar enough to the treatment group, so
that the impacts of cereal banks can be evaluated.
22.4 Impact Evaluation
Based on the PSM results, 134 villages were selected for the survey. Then
we randomly selected 10 % of the households in each village (a total of 460
households). Using this cross-sectional data (Olken 2012), we estimated the average
treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). Our
analysis focuses on indicators of food security, nutrition security, and livelihood
security. Taking our cue from recent literatures about the conceptualization and
measurement of food and nutrition security (Hoddinott 1999; Pangaribowo et al.
2013; Pieters et al. 2013; Laborde Debucquet et al. 2013; Kalkuhl et al. 2013;
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von Braun and Tadesse 2012), we considered various aspects of food security:
availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability.
22.4.1 Empirical Strategy
In the first set of analysis, we compared the mean outcomes to determine if there
are any differences in DIM between the treatment, pure control, and partial control
groups. This is to determine if any of the effects can be reasonably attributed to the
treatment. Since the pretreatment characteristics of villages were considered in the
matching process, any differences in the outcomes can be attributed to the treatment
(Ravallion 2007). Therefore, the DIM indicates the ATE.
22.4.2 Comparison of Means: Treated and Control Villages
As in the PSM, we found that most of the villages remained unchanged in their
physical and socioeconomic features 4 years after implementing the project. This
further validated our PSM. However, among villages, there are also some important
DIM, some of which indicate the ATE of the program (Becker and Ichino 2002).
The households had a food gap of more than 2.5 months on average. The food
gap, also called the lean period or hungry season (FAO 2011), represents the number
of months a household reports not having adequate food stocks or money to buy
food. The households often need to hire out their own labor for money or to take out
a loan. We observed significant differences in the length of lean period among the
households sampled.6 While households in treated villages experienced an average
2.1 months of food gap, the pure control group experienced almost 3 months of food
gap, and the partial control group 2.5 months. Comparing the treated group and the
pure control group, cereal banking reduces the length of lean period by 25 %.
The results for the selling prices of cash crops (groundnut at harvest) and the
buying prices of food crops (millet and maize during the lean period) also indicate
a significant difference between the treatment and control villages. The price effect
is more significant when comparing treated villages and partial control villages.
This indicates that variations in food and cash crop prices is higher in partial
control villages than in the other two groups, suggesting that in the absence of a
food storage, households may produce more food and yet achieve lower incomes.
Variation is defined as the difference between prices of food crops (rice, maize, and
millet) reported in August (lean period) and price of cash crops (groundnut) reported
in December (harvest period) minus the yearly average prices of the same crops.
Figure 22.3 shows that at harvest, when most rural households are net sellers, the
selling prices of excess production are 16 % lower in control villages than treated
villages. In contrast, during the lean period, when most rural households are net
6The lean period or hungry season in the Gambia often starts in July–September.
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Average Price (Jul−Sept)
Average Price (Oct−Dec)
Average Price (Jan − Apr)
Average Price (May−Jun)
Sum of Average Prices of Food Crops in Dalasis
Average Price (Jul − Sept)
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buyers, the buying prices of cereals are significantly lower in control villages than
treated villages (about 15 % lower). This implies selling farm produce at lower
prices and buying food at higher prices for households in control villages compared
to those in treatment villages, contrary to conclusion in Kent (1998).
The following may explain the differences in prices and price variability:
• Households in treated communities reported higher dependency on their own
production for food than those in control group. Thus, treated communities sell
less of their food crops at harvest and buy less food during the lean period,
signifying that they become net buyers of food much later than the control group.
• Cereal banking schemes disincentivize speculative arbitrage, often carried out by
middlemen, moneylenders, and input lenders (Cortès and Carrasco 2012; Kent
1998). As shown in the DIM in Table 22.2, middlemen are more active in control
villages than in treated villages. In the Gambia, middlemen and moneylenders
lend food or inputs to households. Similar to the findings of other empirical stud-
ies in this field (Cole et al. 2012; Morduch 1995; Cortès and Carrasco 2012), it
was observed that when risk management strategies or one form of credit scheme
are in place, there will be less demand for other forms of credit (Gilbert 2012).
• Similar to other research findings, inter-seasonal price changes are more
significant for domestically produced food (millet and maize). Compared to other
similar studies (Afrique Verte 2010; von Braun et al. 1999; Bhattamishra 2012),
this study found a slightly lower, but nonetheless significant, inter-seasonal price
change between harvest and lean seasons: 53 % in treated villages and 84 % in
control villages. The treated villages showed a 31 percentage point reduction in
inter-seasonal price variation.
Table 22.2 Mean outcomes—treated and control villages
Treated Pure control Test Partial control Test
Food gap 2.170 2.830 0.000** 2.490 0.047*
Price cash crop—harvest 726.470 625.000 0.003** 587.230 0.000**
Price food crop—lean 918.570 1057.970 0.002** 959.780 0.177
Variationa in cash crop
prices—harvest
178.180 192.910 0.350 246.660 0.026*
Variation in food crop
prices—lean
114.280 262.640 0.000** 238.630 0.000**
Price of imported rice 1159.14 1155.850 0.775 1153.640 0.639
Self-help groups 1.9 1.6 0.665 1.7 0.872
Ward Development
Committee membership
2.645 1.927 0.894 1.979 0.895
Moneylenders/middlemen 1.4 1.72 0.025 1.68 0.482
Number of villages 35 48 55
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01
aVariation in cash crops at harvest and food crops at the lean period are the difference of the price
at harvest/lean minus the mean price during the year
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Our study also found that there are more local self-help groups in the treated
villages than the control villages. This indicates that when compared to the control
villages, the treated villages are likely to have created more internal networks and
have better capacity to initiate, implement, and sustainably manage their self-help
projects. The treated villages are also significantly more socially connected, having
much more representation in ward- and district-level organizations, such as the Ward
Development Committee (WDC).
In addition, households in the treated villages tend to be more effective at
adapting to changes (Maxwell and Smith 1992) than their counterparts in the control
villages. For example, treated communities were more likely to introduce new
varieties of crops and use extensive production systems (although the latter is not
always sustainable), and their population less likely to migrate.
22.4.3 Estimating Treatment Effect on the Treated
To evaluate the impact of the cereal banking scheme, we conducted a regression
analysis to estimate the actual ATET or the intention to treat (ITT) (Arcand et al.
2010; Duflo et al. 2007).
Our regression model at village level can be described using the equation:
Y.i/ D ˛.w/ C V.i/ C ˇT.i/ C ".i/; (22.2)
where Y(i) is the outcome variable of village i, ˛ represents baseline village
characteristics which allows for estimation with and without fixed effects (w), V(i)
is a vector of village level characteristics, T is the cereal bank dummy (T D 1 if
treated, 0 otherwise), and "(i) is the error term. ˛ is the baseline outcome, and  and
ˇ are parameters that need to be estimated. The dummy T is included in Eq. (22.2) to
assess the impact of the CDDP treatment on treated and partial control villages. We
also estimate the models using fixed effects, comparing the treated villages with the
pure control and partial control villages. The combination of fixed-effect estimation
and propensity-score matching reduces the selection bias caused by time-invariant
missing variable endogeneity or selection on unobservable bias (Duflo et al. 2007).
Two main indicators are identified after reviewing current literature on food and
nutrition insecurity.
Food Gap Effects
The food gap, a proxy for food availability, is the number of months in a year
households report having inability to satisfy their food needs (Maxwell and Smith
1992). Households and communities in the Gambia with food deficit experience
food gap because of the unavailability or high cost of food during the lean period.
This affects food and micronutrient intakes as well as farm investments and yields.
We therefore use the food gap as a measure of household food availability.
Comparing with pure control and partial control villages, villages with cereal
banks saw a significant reduction in food gap, with and without fixed effects
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(Table 22.3). Middlemen reduce the food gap as well, even though the extent of
their influence is debatable. The distance of a village to a main road, which is a
proxy for market access, is positively correlated to the food gap.
The further away a village is from lowland areas, the larger the food gap is. This
is understandable since lowland areas have higher crop-growing potentials and can
allow for off-season gardening (Ceesay 2004). Some of the lowland villages are also
able to practice double cropping of rice (von Braun et al. 1989; Carney 1992).
The prices of food crops during the lean period (July–September) also signif-
icantly increased the food gap in all cases. Thus, managing inter-seasonal prices
could be an effective way of shortening the lean period in rural areas of the Gambia.
Although the CDDP intervention reduced food gap, it does not significantly
shorten the lean period. This is because the CDDP had various other community
subprojects, some of which may not have a direct and immediate impact on food
production and smoothing consumption. Using fixed effects is important because it
increases the precision of our model, evident in the R2 and the standard error values
of our treatment variables.
Price Variability
Inter-seasonal changes in prices of the three major crops in the Gambia7 is a proxy
for food accessibility. In Amartya Sen’s book Poverty and Famines written in 1981,
he argued that the problem of hunger or food insecurity is not only about food
availability, but there could also be structural, cultural, or economic circumstances
that deny some people access to food, even when food is available. Thus, some
of the key indicators of food insecurity include household income, food prices,
and household expenditure (von Braun 2011). High food prices during the lean
period inhibit food-deficit poor households from buying and consuming adequate
amount of food (Gilbert 2012). When food prices are high, poor households in
rural areas often adopt various strategies to alleviate the situation. These strategies
include reducing frequency and quantity of food intake, foregoing other basic needs,
and taking out loans or working to purchase food. The strategies can, however,
further exacerbate their indebtedness and poverty (Action Aid 2011). To capture
the changes in inter-seasonal price variability, we constructed a price variability
model:
Log .Pl–Ph/ D ˛.w/ C V.i/ C ˇT.i/ C ıCDDP .i/ C ".i/; (22.3)
where Pl and Ph are prices of food crops during lean period and harvest period
respectively.
Our results in Table 22.4 show that cereal banking leads to a significant reduction
in the inter-seasonal food price deviation between harvest and lean period. The
7Rice, millet, and groundnut
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coefficient on the treatment indicates that cereal banking reduced inter-seasonal
price changes by an average of 41 %.
Similar to findings in another study (Oguoma et al. 2010), our results show
that the speculative behavior of middlemen increases inter-seasonal food price
variability. The influence of middlemen on the market, prices, and food security at
the local level is debatable; most evidence indicates that middlemen exploit farmers
and erode profits. Oguoma et al. (2010) argued that the intervention by middlemen
increases buying prices for consumers and reduces selling prices for producers,
lowering the farmers’ profit margins. Often the middlemen engage in temporary
arbitrage (Kent 1998), which may also cause the food prices to increase further.
This negatively affects the food security of farmers, who shift from being net seller
at harvest to net buyers during the lean periods (Bhattamishra 2012).
The district dummies in the fixed-effect model highlighted the importance of
double cropping, a practice applicable to district 9 (Fulladu East). In contrast to
district 1, district 9 saw a reduction in the inter-seasonal price deviation and food
gap.
Other social indicators are changes in demographic characteristics, population
growth, and membership in Ward Development Committee (WDC)—a proxy for
social capital (Jaimovich 2012). The cereal banking scheme provides a platform for
debates about community actions, and gives members an opportunity to organize
and manage a program for their community. Over time, the social interaction within
a community may enhance intra-village social relations and build the capacity of
the community to participate and contribute to other development initiatives.
22.5 Conclusion
The results support the hypothesis that cereal banking is an important part of
enhancing the food and nutrition security of communities by improving food
availability, accessibility, and stability. Cereal banking could reduce food price
variability and food gap by more than 25 %. This can be attributed to communities
having sufficient food during the lean periods, thus reducing speculations.
While community cereal banking schemes may be effective in addressing inter-
seasonal price variations and idiosyncratic risks, they are less effective against
covariate risks, especially climate risks. In addition to the risk of embezzlement,
there is a high failure rate during periods of poor rainfall.
The results of the propensity-score matching analysis emphasize the need to
target a program at appropriate villages based on village characteristics, which
influence the choice, sustainability, and impact of the program.
Compared with food aid or humanitarian aid, cereal banking is a more engaging
solution that helps vulnerable communities to secure their livelihood and build
up their resilience. It empowers affected households to participate and take up
ownership. Thus, it could be an effective and participatory channel for food aid
delivery during drought. This is very important because price and climate risks are
reoccurrences (Cortès and Carrasco 2012).
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While food reserves at the macro level require more careful management and
present a large logistical and financial challenge, cereal banking at the community
level has the unique advantage of being less cumbersome—the closer proximity
to vulnerable communities results in lower transportation and administrative costs
(Coulter 2009).
Appendix








Unmatched 0:2647 0:2428 2:92 0:264 0:247 1.68
Matched 0:2644 0:2625 0:19 0:264 0:266 0.18
Poverty index Unmatched 0:7061 0:6543 2:7 0:7061 0:6604 2.262
Matched 0:7061 0:732 1:23 0:7061 0:705 0.053
Millet grown Unmatched 227:289 148:82 2:15 227:29 170:247 1.41
Matched 227:289 221:77 0:08 227:29 178:034 0.8
Availability of
fruit trees
Unmatched 4332:19 5795:61 1:61 4332:191 5281:032 1.13
Matched 4332:19 3811:68 0:76 4332:191 3165:702 1.83
Pp of crop farmers Unmatched 0:9657 0:921 4:14 0:966 0:927 3.76
Matched 0:96574 0:9681 0:41 0:966 0:97 0.83
Av. HH size Unmatched 11:419 11:12 0:62 11:419 11:245 0.35
Matched 11:419 11:64 0:33 11:419 11:71 0.44
No daily market Unmatched 81:476 62:65 4:24 81:477 66:731 3.46
Matched 81:47 82:54 0:27 81:477 80:683 0.2
Distance from
market
Unmatched 43:308 41:83 0:55 43:309 40:949 0.9




Unmatched 98:22 91:72 3:43 98:23 92:968 3.06
Matched 98:229 97:668 0:54 98:23 97:415 0.72
Remote and
upland villages
Unmatched 0:5106 0:4108 1:31 0:5546 0:4208 1.88
Matched 0:5106 0:5106 0 0:5546 0:55 0
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